Default moral norms
- The|My aim [here] is a normative ethic [and] the|my method [of elaborating it]
[is] [loosely] constructivist.
- The normative force of the ethic originates with commitments [that] we freely impose
on ourselves, and carries through to precepts that are the necessary,
practical constructions of those commitments.
- This first leg of the ethic, however, is a merely formal construction.
- It gives [ready|easy] access to the precepts (rights and duties)
from a ground|premise [that] few would balk at accepting.
/ One need not have one’s head in the stars.
- But it fails to explain the origin of their binding force, their authority over us.
- This is because the ground|premise by which we enter [is a belief that]
simply assumes that authority.
belief: Moral norms exist and bind one.
\ Here telling in advance the core principle (most directly behind my inference of rights)
\ and the challenge it poses, namely finding a morally obligatory end to serve as a premise,
\ as grist for its mill.
fact: The set of moral norms is controversial.
∴ The set of moral norms is unknown.
- In the same spirit that one accepts the binding force of moral norms,
one may expect to be responsible for knowing what those norms are.
principle: Having reason to believe that the set of moral norms is unknown,
one is morally bound to will knowledge of that set, to take it as one’s end.
end: Knowledge of the set of moral norms.
principle: What is enjoined by duty is entitled by right.
condition: Ends justification.
condition: Personal freedom.
condition: Personal security.
- We have a moral right to [each of] the conditions of practical reason,
and we have the duties that correspond to those rights.
!! A mere agent-relative fact would not suffice to ground (the mutual recognition of) rights.
: re `! (.+)$` cf. `${same}$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/03_origin_hypothesis/README.brec
- The ground here being merely a belief (an agent-relative fact), it does not follow that
others would necessarily hold the same belief and thereby have the same rights as oneself.
+ Repair by entailing rights and duties in a moral law, and one take up the law *as such*,
for then one must expect others to take it up and thereby get the same rights as oneself.
: re `one take up the law .as such.` see e.g.
~/work/ethic/._/03_origin_hypothesis/README.brec
right: Ends justification.
right: Personal freedom.
right: Personal security.
- Mere non-hindrance|allowance does not suffice for the exercise of a right.
- Coupled with a duty of non-hindrance, we [also] have a duty of provision and maintenance.
duty: To uphold the means of ends justification, and to provide it where lacking.
duty: To uphold the means of personal freedom, and to provide it where lacking.
duty: To uphold the means of personal security, and to provide it where lacking.
\ Copyright © 2023 Michael Allan.