80, notes — precepts
? how anchor the rights as strongly as the duties
∵ the *principle of right by duty* cannot do this
: privately re `(.(principle) of right by duty.)` see
`^*${2}: what law enjoins by duty it entitles by right.+\\ ${1}` @
~/work/ethic/._/10/20.brec
: privately re `cannot do this` see `^*- it is a weak principle` @
~/work/ethic/._/10/20.brec
| reason’s being justified in itself directly constrains the will not only positively as an end,
but also negatively as a limiting constraint
: see notepad:2023-12-23c
- to infer the negative duties (rights) as surely as the positive requires a strong principle
- if symmetry will not suffice for that principle (I doubt it can), then rest on
the fact that reason exists both individually in each mind and at large among all
- for the former, only duties perfect and negative make sense;
for the latter, only duties imperfect and positive
- no need to claim that *only* reason as an end is justified in itself
- rather I refer to the (abstract) set of *all* ends that are justified in themselves
: e.g. notepad:2023-12-23c
- thus I need claim only that reason is a member of that set
\ Copyright © 2023 Michael Allan.