Notes on the report of a default ground for practical reasoning

    argue+ for a default (practical) ground whose object is knowledge of whether
      there is a (practical) ground, and (if so) what [it consists in]
        : see @ ../../normative/._/14.default+stable_ground/4_our_practical_binding_to_a_purpose_of_endurance/45.brec
    moral law, conditions that hold
        a) a principle defining the criteria of right action
            : see @ `^^moral law, conditions$`i @ ~/work/ethics/._/text.notes.brec
            ∃ a principle that defines the criteria of right action as one criterion:

                criterion of right action: action having as an end a practical ground

            ∴ this condition holds
                - satisfaction of the criterion depends on the existence of a practical ground,
                  which at present is assured for us by the existence of a default practical ground
                    : ad `(at present).+(for us)` : if no other practical ground exists to be discovered
                      (viz. none that is stable) and we come to learn of this, then (for us) the default
                      ground will cease to exist and right action (by this criterion) will be impossible
                - but this contingency in satisfying the criterion affects neither the criterion itself
                  nor the principle, both remain absolute regardless
                    repair+ this point
                            ∵ now it is (at the least) out of context
                            ∵ coherence now (probably) requires either that a stable practical ground
                              exists to be discovered, or that we could never learn otherwise
                                ∵ our creators’ forcing us to do what is impossible makes no sense
                        | forestall and mitigate the problem
                            | assert that we need never come to feel that our search for knowledge of a
                              stable ground is endless — reaching ever further and getting no closer —
                              because always it lies open to conclude that this apparent endlessness does
                              not indicate so much a negative conclusion of non-existence, as it amounts
                              rather to a positive demonstration that the stable ground lies in either:
                                    i) the attempt itself, comparable to the default ground, or
                                    ii) practical reason, rationality or reasoning itself
                                / the definition of the ground criteria would have to allow for this,
                                  e.g. by making the criteria merely sufficient as opposed to necessary
                        | add a further truth of practical logic|reason that ensures of its integrity,
                          and thereby is necessary
                            | a (further) criterion of right (qua rational) action
                                - strange to think (yet quite possible) that such
                                  an *optimistic outlook* in regard to our prospects
                                  is made an obligatory standpoint for action
                                  by our creators’ command and enforcement of it
                        | postulate of practical logic|reason what ensures of its integrity
        b) its command (addressed demand) by our creator
            : see @ `^^moral law, conditions$`i @ ~/work/ethics/._/text.notes.brec
        c) the creator’s backing of it by force
            : see @ `^^moral law, conditions$`i @ ~/work/ethics/._/text.notes.brec