Notes on the ethic !! / summary of problems and proposed solutions : re `problems` see `^*!! confusion and hesitancy$` : re `problems` see `^*!! conceptual analysis of will has turned out to be fruitless$` restart+ the ethic afresh : see @ `^*!! confusion and hesitancy$` analyze not will+ but the fittingness of the cosmos : see @ `^*!! conceptual analysis of will has turned out to be fruitless$` factor out+ to a separate text the thesis that our extinction is not inevitable, that ultimately the most daunting of obstacles to aeviternity might be overcome : see @ `^*!! confusion and hesitancy$` still+ : see @ `^*!! conceptual analysis of will has turned out to be fruitless$` !! primality is not essential to will to will | knowingly to self-determine (independently determine) one’s intentionality - ‘knowingly’ not ‘consciously’: | consciousness of truth implies neither knowledge (true, justified belief) nor even belief; one may be conscious of a truth (here independently intending) yet think it an hallucination and thus not believe it | consciousness does not imply belief (and thus knowledge); one might be conscious of independently intending, yet think it an hallucination = knowingly to independently intend | to independently intend, with justified credence and thus knowledge of one’s independence in so determining one’s own intentionality will - the power to will | a knowingly self-determinable (independently determinable) intentionality / possessable by a subject alone, for only a thinking entity is capable of belief and thus knowledge ∵ the whole determinant might be reasoning based exclusively on the essentials of will ∵ it suffices (for the condition of independence) that the (whole) determinant be inherent to will ∵ reason is inherent to will ∵ to will entails the thought of determining one’s own intentionality ∵ to will entails credence of determining one’s own intentionality ∵ credence is thought ∵ to believe is to think ∵ the thought of determining one’s own intentionality entails reason ∵ the thought of determining entails reason ∵ to determine is to cause ∵ the thought of causation entails reason ∵ the thought of causation entails an understanding of cause and effect ∵ an understanding of cause and effect requires reason !! this is uncertain | rather reason is needed not for the understanding, but for the knowledge of this, which knowledge willing requires ∵ whether or not the thought of causation requires reason, justification of one’s credence of causation certainly does + add such justification, which you forgot, for knowledge is true and *justified* belief ?!! why does belief alone not suffice? why must it be justified belief and thus knowledge? : join ∵ the thought of intentionality entails reason ∵ intentionality is the power of intending ∵ intending is thinking of causing ∵ the *thought* of thinking of causing entails reason ∵ the thought of causation entails reason : see ∵ will is possessable by a subject alone, for only a thinking entity is capable of the knowledge essential to willing : re `knowledge essential to willing` see `^*= knowingly to independently intend` @ `^^to will$` ∵ knowledge entails thought ∵ knowledge entails belief ∵ a belief is a thought - thus will might conceivably be primal, or rationally determined / and other determinants aside from reason might be conceivable - yet clearly no will of a human could be primal !! conceptual analysis of will has turned out to be fruitless - one may construct any number of types of subject that are endowed with intentionality and find within each a determinant of its intentionality that is proper to the type, able to produce the self-determination that is necessary for will ∴ constructing a *minimal* type and finding within it a potential determinant of reason does not give that determinant any special priority analyze not will+ but the fittingness of the cosmos : see notepad:2025-1-14b - finding both a God-like creator and a truth of reason / the former having apparently acted on the basis of the latter - either alone would suggest recourse to the tradition of moral law, simply from its definition / and here I have both together + take that recourse - without further arguing for it ∵ apparently it is beyond my ability ∵ plausibly it is beyond *human* ability at present - rather let the seeming evidence (of a basis for moral law) do the work of convincing / proceeding thence by a postulate, for instance still+ to will: awaringly to self-determine (independently determine) one’s intentionality / thus we conceive of willing = awaringly to independently intend - even if reasoning were not *necessary* to willing (so conceived), thus accessible by analysis, still it would *suffice* for it and thus be accessible by synthesis, because adding reason to a subject’s intentionality would enable: • an understanding (thus an awareness) of that intentionality through the cause and effect involved in it • an awaring determination of that intentionality through the subject’s reasoning ∵ the subject’s reasoning need be moved only by its inherent responsive to principles of logic that are primal, thus themselves unmoved / no factor alien to the subject (as defined) is wanted for this, only those inherent and thus proper to it ∴ I can hypothesize an explanation the rational part of the moral law’s underpinning / additional to the part played by the command of a God-like creator, whose authority as a giver of moral law hardly needs explaining - already analysis of the cosmic fittingness has given me a possible explanation for it: a creator’s reasoning based on a practical ground : see `^*analyze not will\+ but the fittingness of the cosmos$` @ `^*!! conceptual analysis of will has turned out to be fruitless$` : see notepad:2025-1-14b | to will: awaringly to self-determine (independently determine) one’s intentionality / thus we conceive of willing = awaringly to independently intend = awaringly to independently bind oneself to being a cause of an object as one’s effect - through doing the latter in regard to the object of the practical ground, I both: • attain willing • independently give to myself a principle of [maintaining] willing, and thereby of action / here is an instance of autonomy proceed+ in what follows thus: + ask: what must be added to that giving of a principle of willing, that it become a giving of the law of willing? ∵ I am trying to reconcile the two traditions ∵ that of a creator’s command traditionally rests on a *supernatural* creater, and as such has served here as a further scaffold to willing, demanding a further breaking free in order to attain the reality : re `further scaffold` cf. `^*- here genomic instinct served as a scaffold$` : re `further breaking free`p cf. `^*- only by.+breaking.+free.+could we attain the reality`s + postulate that addition ∵ then I indeed break free - I take it to be true, a truth (like that of a stable ground) whose basis we have yet to learn + (add that) I take that principle to hold universally / based maybe on my analysis of the cosmic fittingness / based maybe on a recourse to volition owing to failures of argument, mine and others since the birth of ethics + (add that) thereby I (and we who do likewise) make moral law / so I argue, salvaging as necessary from the alternative(s) just below - this (on the rational account) is where morality comes from - practical reason in conjunction with genomic instinct had long ago put in our minds the *concepts* of will and morality - here genomic instinct served as a scaffold / no metaphor, for the creator intended it - only by finally breaking (determinatively) free of it, however, could we attain the reality - this is what the creator has done and expects us to emulate | - one’s reasoning that awaringly, in response to principles of logic, conforms to those principles and thereby determines one’s intentionality to the object of the practical ground thereby constitutes one’s willing ∴ that conformance is a *principle* of [the maintenance of] [right] willing, and thereby of [right] action ∴ that conformance is a *moral* principle ∵ the principle is proper to morality ∵ we conceive the sphere of morality to be bounded by willing and action ∵ the principle is proper to [right] willing and thereby [right] action / viz. that conformance is a moral ∵ we conceive morals to be the principles of [right] willing and thereby [right] action ∵ we conceive the sphere of morality to be bounded by willing and action ∴ that conformance is a *moral* law ∵ the principle is universal ?!! what makes it universally obligatory - I have not (and probably cannot) argue that it’s the only way to constitute will + add that, based on one’s analysis of the cosmic fittingness, one takes conformance to entail an end of indefinite endurance ?!! why does belief alone not suffice? why must it be justified belief and thus knowledge? : see : see notepad:2025-1-19b : contra notepad:2025-1-19a - yet ‘consciousness’ is the wrong word, pertaining to outer perception - and ‘belief’ might not suffice, neither for the concept nor pulling in reason - for the former, at least, it may need to be justified by some kind of (inner) evidence + from this note tell precisely what pulls in reason, and whether it is proper to the concept - ‘thinking’ is the word I want base intentionality, prior to will - ‘thinking’ sets the stage to pull in reason ∵ it pulls in logic ∵ it pulls in thinking of intention, a concept that involves cause and effect, thus logic !! not *all* of logic is pulled in by this will - thinking is proper our concept of will ∵ subjectivity is proper to will ?!! but so is awareness, thus why ‘thinking’? | accept awareness, too, thus simply ‘subjective’ !! confusion and hesitancy / I can hardly discern the cause in hindsight, except that among the factors I detect an over-accumulation of theses, some of which might better be addressed in separate texts, rather than awkwardly crammed into one. : see `\| factor out.+those theses whose arguments could better stand alone$` : therefore | factor out to separate texts those theses whose arguments could better stand alone restart+ the ethic afresh - archiving the present version under `./._/17_primal_will/` factor out+ to a separate text the thesis that our extinction is not inevitable, that ultimately the most daunting of obstacles to aeviternity might be overcome - arguing for it on premises of mathematics and physical evidence - drafting and publishing (as best I can) the argument - engaging en passent with others who argue for/against the same conclusion | abandon the ethical frame - simply arguing instead that our extinction is not inevitable, that ultimately the most daunting of obstacles to aeviternity might be overcome : join `^*factor out.+the thesis that our extinction is not inevitable` @ `^*!! confusion and hesitancy$` / this alone appears to be all that I can contribute presently in the way of theory : note : Theory pertinant to what concerns me, that is. This excludes ethics per se. Otherwise I might contribute the practical grounding of a default ethic. - retitling the ethic merely as ‘notes toward’ such - archiving its present version under `./._/17_primal_will/` - removing its archive from `./._/` to `./` | escape from these difficulties by using the relation between values/goods and practical reasons / a relation on which I have (among these ethic files) commented earlier - viz. using the fact that: - values/goods that are valuable/good for something relate to relative practical reasons / aka means - values/goods that are absolutely valuable/good (so in themselves, or intrinically so) relate to absolute practical reasons / aka ends (justified) in themselves, practical grounds, final causes - thus engaging with others who argue for an obligatory aim of extinction avoidance - engaging especially with philosophers whose arguments (like mine) are based on premises other than maximizing valued goods like happiness or lives lived ∵ apparently all such philosophers base their arguments, instead, on absolute value/good : see `^*Q\..+extinction avoidance.+Exclude.+arguments.+based on maximizing`s @ `^^comparable projects$`i - beginning here ∴ with research for a likely point of engagement ∵ I base my argument, instead, on reason/rationality/logic ∵ reason is essential to will, and thus to [moral] normativity ∵ value/good as such is *not* essential to [moral] normativity - rather only that value/good is essential that (through desire) arises from reason or some other faculty/power/property essential to will (and thus to [moral] normativity) ?+ (re)join with the default ethic? ?+ to what advantage for the present ethic? • deepening it, giving one insight into the original reasoning that might lie behind primal will’s determination • acknowledging it, too, as a default ethic / in default of knowing primal will’s precise determination ?+ to what advantage for the default ethic? • deepening it, enlarging the scale in time and space / while keeping the whole a default ethic : see `^*• acknowledging it, too, as a default ethic$` @ `^*\?\+ to what advantage for the present ethic\?$` ? how do the two ethics relate? • each is premised on (the concept of) an unconditioned condition (absolute reason) : ad `unconditioned condition` : from Kant, I think, who in the Groundwork wrote (to the effect) that always reason seeks the unconditioned condition - the present ethic rests on an absolute theoretic reason / aka original|primal|first cause, theoretic ground - the default ethic rests on an absolute practical reason / aka final cause, practical ground, end (justified) in itself • together the two are mythic, telling whence we come and whither we go - the original cause of the present ethic tells where we come from - the final cause or practical ground of the default ethic tells where (properly) we are (or ought to be) going • each is argued (from its premise) by the method of conceptual analysis - thus the claims that sit atop the present ethic fit also the default ethic : re `claims.+atop the present ethic` see `^*- analysis.+yields a.+normative ethic$`s @ 01_objective_basis.brec + consider ∴ wrapping the present claims in a more general set, covering both ethics rework+ : see @ ._/01_objective_basis_4.brec - analysis of willing, in conjunction with supporting physical evidence, yields an objective basis for a normative ethic : see @ 01_objective_basis.brec - add to the ‘yield’: still wanted?+ \ + a candidate for the popular notion of the meaning of life \\ with the other claims, this one now seems superfluous + a moral authority of God-like stature - rights, duties and [a [sense of]] purpose as close to God-given as one may get without supernatural suppositions - freedom consists in self-provision - ultimately nothing that a human (nor indeed humanity) has is self-provided - all was given by the freedom of a will that is not its own, but that of its creator - no superstition, no supernatural premise warrants this|my claim, but [rather] a|the (forthcoming) conceptual analysis of will and the physical evidence {it prompts one to recognize|whose recognition it cues} : re `physical evidence` see `^*- ${same}.+that such will did exist at one time`s @ 81_evidence.brec + a framework for dealing with the mounting existential crisis of the Holocene [that presently besets us] ∵ I must believe the reader’s attention is got at the outset, and held at every step ∵ on this my motivation depends order+ to avoid confusion in: • thought ← notepad / ordering thought by entering notes in the notepad • notepad ← text / ordering the notepad by translating its notes into text structure or content, or therein referring to them + sync with the present notepad and its newer archive : viz. notepad:2023-7-17a… : (or what since then is extant) thither from the present, working backwards in time + here refer also to the latest note dealt with / that subsequent notes may be distinguished and later dealt with, too deal with+ and incorporate textually if useful each active external note, deactivating any to which the texts no longer refers tear no+ inactive leaf till a) subsequent leaves are torn and b) all text searched for references to the leaf, else references (in notepad or text) may break / thus any active leaf, viz. referenced from text, stops all earlier leafs (that contain notes on the ethics) from being torn + sync with the archive of my discussions with Thomas : privately viz. `^^our talks$`i @ `^^Hahn, Thomas$`i @ ~/_/zz.brec : working through it backwards in time + sync with the text archive : viz. ._/ : working through it backwards in time + sync with the older notepad archive : viz. notepad:2023-6-2…2023-7-11 : these alone of the older archive need syncing, working through them backwards in time • text ← thought / ordering the texts by reflection + fortify at the riskiest points comparable projects Q. Compile please a list of philosophers who most recently have argued for an obligatory aim of extinction avoidance, complete with dated citations. Exclude from the list arguments that are based on maximizing a valued good, such as happiness or lives lived. Order the list from latest to earliest. : privately see `^^AI$`i @ ~/_/zz.brec A. Here is a list of philosophers who have recently argued for an obligatory aim of extinction avoidance, excluding arguments based on maximizing valued goods like happiness or lives lived, ordered from latest to earliest: : see https://www.perplexity.ai/ : Compile please a list of philosophers who most recently have argued for an obligatory aim of extinction avoidance. Exclude from the list arguments that are based on maximizing a valued good, such as happiness or lives lived. Order the list from latest to earliest. • Toby Ord (2024) - Argues that humanity has intrinsic value beyond just the sum of individual human lives, and that we have an obligation to preserve this. \ : see https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/107/2/99/7629690?login=false \\ contains no direct reference to Ord (2024), nor to such an argument by him • Johann Frick (2017) - Contends that humanity has "final value" that should be cherished and protected, distinct from simply creating more happy people. : see https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/107/2/99/7629690?login=false • Nick Bostrom (2013) - Proposes that we have a stronger moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill the entire human population compared to smaller-scale disasters, based on the unique value of humanity's continued existence. : https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=12056&context=etd - This list is relatively short because many arguments for avoiding extinction are based on maximizing goods like happiness or the number of lives lived, which were excluded per the query instructions. The philosophers listed above argue for humanity's intrinsic or unique value as a reason to avoid extinction, rather than solely focusing on maximizing positive outcomes. safeguarding moral rights, pending independent publication • attribution as author of the works • integrity of the works : cf @ ._/14_default+stable_ground/notes.brec - the Wayback Machine should suffice here : see http://web.archive.org/web/20240911133046/http://reluk.ca/ - here it failed to archive the Breccian Web image files / probably ∵ I had (prior to 2025-1-8) been using an Apache `IndexIgnore` directive to omit the image files from my server’s directory index - it did, however, archive their `.brec` source files / it repointed the hyperlinks for the Breccian source files in the directory indeces (to their `.brec.xht` images ∵ it ran (a copy of) the same script as the server), but still one can access them by manipulating the URL in the browser’s address bar / wanting to find others of a like mind, I should make *myself* findable, too \ Copyright © 2024-2025 Michael Allan.